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AN IDEAL PRESERVED (7)
OTIS P. DOBIEP
A current British historian, writing of the Regency Period (circa 1800),
after recounting the glorious achievements of that lusty era - the defeat of
Napoleon in global war, the repulsion of revolution, the expansion of trade
and the empire; all without loss of the political liberty of the citizen -
attributes the latter to the political structure of the government of the time,
which kept the ministries too small for mischievous power expansions, con-
stantly subjected to scrutiny and curb by the sources of their powers: Crown,
Parliament, and People, and mindful of the right of the citizens to hold
them accountable in the Courts to the Rule of Law.' One has only to read
the Declaration of Independence to note that this was the Ideal of Govern-
ment to Americans of the time and the genesis of our constitutional structure
of checks and balances, rule of law, and diffusion of power. But, Historian
Bryant, in closing, recalls that this ideal proved inadequate to the problems
of later times and underwent gradual revision. By the decade of the 1930's,
both in Britain and America, in the wake of depression, new power groupings
and wholesale yearnings after new political panaceas, the hitherto gradual
revision of the Ideal was speeded. The development of large ministries, in-
cluding prominently the so-called independent administrative boards, claim-
ing broad powers and relative freedom from scrutiny and curb by the execu-
tive, legislature, and the courts, especially the last two, was not without
bitter opposition which harked back to the Historical Ideal and gloomily
predicted loss of the citizen's liberty to these unfathomable labyrinths of
irresponsible power.2 By the decade of the 1940's, the boards had established
their right to exist, even in large size,3 as necessary and expeditious means of
accomplishing demanded state action. The opposition and detached ob-
servers retreated to the task of salvaging a desirable minimum of the Histori-
cal Ideal by formulating rules of scrutiny and curbs of board powers by the
executive, legislature, and courts. This process of formulation is still in
progress, is an important problem of our time, and can be discussed in
terms of the relations of the boards with the institutions just mentioned
and certain others.
*B.A. 1928, Randolph-Macon College; LL.B. 1932, University of Virginia; LL.M.
1935, Harvard University; Member of the Virginia Bar; Flexner Professor of Law, Uni-
versity of Louisville Law School.
I. BRYANT, THE AcE OF ELEGANCi 259-63 (1951).
2. The dramatic story has been told to the point of nausea in a vast literature with
which the lawyer is familiar. Concise r~sum6s, with bibliographical references, are in
DAvis ON ADMINISTRATIVE LAw 4-10 (1951); GELLIUORN, CASES AND COMMENTS ON AD-
MINISTRATivW LAw 758-67 (1940).
3. Attacks on board size have decreased as the boards, after initial periods of growth,
have tended to stabilize their complements.
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RELATIONS WITH THE EXECUTIVE
Usually boards are given some executive functions of a specific nature.
Examples are the CAB's and ICC's duties to maintain programs of research
aid for their respective carriers. The Hoover Commission has suggested that
these duties be turned over to appropriate older government departments.
More generally, boards' relations with the Executive, arising out of their
general duty to enforce their programs of regulation, are most acute in times
of political change. The new board is established to carry out a program of
regulations of certain groups brought into being by the political victory of
other groups. For a time, the new board is likely to regulate the subjected
groups with a heavy hand; its statute so directs and its initial membership is
weighted with friends of the victorious political climate. But then comes
the usual political reaction, both generally and specifically as the boards'
excesses are displayed. Then, the political pendulum swings again to re-
form, but with different orientations, and usually with a new Executive-
Party Leader who demands that the board get in tune with the new "man-
date of the people." More often than not, the legislators-party stalwarts will
have their own versions of the mandate. Through it all, the board has its
own peculiar mandate that it follow the popular mandate, if such can be
found, and yet not so closely that its regulatory regimen can be branded
"political" rather than "legal." If the disputants cannot agree, each resorts
to the available legal and political pressures, the ultimate of which is "carry-
ing the case to the people."4 While all this causes agony to the advocates
of streamlined government, it is, with its checks and balances, scrutiny and
curbs, soundly in accordance with the Historical Ideal.
As the number of boards increase, the possibility of "jurisdictional dis-
putes" among them mounts. The courts may take a hand if the involved
statutes give a sufficient legal handle and the problem be important and yet
not too much of a "political question" such as they avoid. More frequently,
the Executive, concerned over the effect of confusion upon his program and
prestige, attempts co-ordination.6
RELATIONS WITH THE LEGISLATURE
The constitutional rule is usually stated that the legislature cannot
delegate its legislative power too broadly to boards; it must state the general
4. See Rathburn v. United States, 295 U.S. 602 (1935) for President Roosevelt's
efforts to bring the FTC in line with the New Deal by firing the Hoover hold-over
chairman for "political incompatibility." F.D.R. also attempted to convert the ICC
and FCC by revising their Acts and packing their membership. See Herring, Politics,
Personalities, and the FTC, 28 AM. POL. Sci. REv. 1016. (1934), 29 AM. PO-. Sci. REv.
21 (1935). In recent months, President Truman and the Federal Reserve Board have
more or less carried to the people their differences over inflation control policies. See
Back, The Federal Reserve Board and the Treasury, 29 HARv. Bus. REv. 29 (1951).
5. Shields v. Utah Idaho R.R., 305 U.S. 177 (1938); Thompson v. Texas Mexican
R.R., 328 U.S. 134 (1946).
6. HymEMAN, BuRAucRAcY IN A Dmociucr (1950) develops the theme of a
central administrative council of various officials and elder statesmen to co-ordinate
policies and conflicts in the governmental structure generally.
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legislative policy under standards reasonably specifying the limits of the
board power, leaving the latter merely power to "fill in the details," "fix the
contingencies of application" or "fit to specific situations."7 Actually, when
the legislature is faced with a heavy agenda, a "political hot potato" or a
highly novel subject, it is likely to delegate the problem to the boards in very
broad terms.8 As these states of affairs become the normal, and especially, as
the legislature is engrossed in investigations, appropriations and foreign
policy, such delegations will doubtless increase. There are those who argue
that this type of delegation is salutary, the boards legislating from their ex-
pertise, with the legislature free to check up and correct when necessary.9
Though how far the legislature, under the conditions just mentioned, will do
so is problematical. 10 All in all, the boards today, under their inherent rule-
making power, their interpretive power, their investigations and framing of
bills for the legislature, exercise great legislative power.1 However, the
legislature itself is still far from inactive. 12 The boards, legislating in the
relative quiet and deliberateness of their legislating procedures, have the
invaluable opportunity of working out rules meeting the unanimous approval
of all affected parties and the general public, and thus avoiding one of the
great dangers of democracy, the possible tyranny of majority rule.' 3 Of
course, the boards must be careful to insure that all affected parties and the
general public are represented in their procedures. Recently, concern has
been expressed over the tendency of some boards to legislate by summary
fiat: the board, or, even worse, merely some member, without the use of any
legislative procedures, will utter by word, letter or press release, an informal
"warning" or "policy declaration" which, practically if not legally, has an
immediate and injurious effect on the operations of subjected parties. 4 If
7. Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414 (1944).
8. Jaffe, An Essay on Delegation of egislative Power, 47 COL. L. REv. 359 (1947).
9. See Griffith, The Place of Parliament in the Legislative Process, 14 MOD. L.
Rav. 279 (1950); Griffith, The Constitutional Significance of Delegated Legislation in
England, 48 MxcH. L. Rzv. 1079 (1950).
10. The N.Y. Times, Aug. 21, 1951, p. 35, col. 6, 7, reported the House Judi-
ciary Committee projecting a sweeping investigation of the SEC, following accusations of
favoritism to subjected groups represented by former board staffers.
11. I.C.C. 49 (1945); I.C.C. 61 (1950). Recently, the FTC has been drafting
a comprehensive revision of the acts relative to interlocking directorates. See Copeland,
The FTC Indicts Itself, 29 HARV. Bus. REv. 25 (1951). While the boards' power of
investigation is not as broad as that of the legislature, because of the prerequisite of
showing that the exercise is within the statutory power of the board, it is very broad.
See United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632 (1950); Davis, Administrative
Power of Investigation, 56 YALe L.J. 1111 (1949). And note the vast possibilities of
United States v. Shapiero, 335 U.S. 1 (1948.
12. See the ICC Reports, supra note 11.
13. Morris L. Cooke has recently suggested that Washington administrators are
increasingly aware of the feasibility and desirability of working out regulations having
unanimous consent, N.Y. Times, June 17, 1951, § 6, p. 21. Admittedly, the task would
be difficult but worth the effort, to avoid having 50% to 55%, the usual politically vie
torious majority, be tyrants over the strong minority.
14. This problem is dealt with in Columbia Broadcasting System Inc. v. United
States, 316 U.S. 407 (1942). See Davis, Administrative Powers of Suspending, Advising,
Declaring, and Informally Adjudicating, 63 HARv. L. Rv. 193 (1949).
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the subject-matter be one of great current political agitation or one tran-
scending the specialty of the board, it would seem advisable for the board
to refer it to the legislature itself.15
RELATIONS WITH THE COURTS
The Ideal posed at the start of this discussion emphasized that the
boards should be constantly accountable to the rule of law in the courts at
the suit of affected citizens. The advocates of great board power argue that
this rule of law is not necessarily court-monitored, that, as King James and
many executives since have protested, the boards can read the law and will
follow it; that the boards from their expertise can give a better reading; that
resort to the courts will frustrate the regulatory program by technicalities;
and, finally, that the wronged citizen has his remedy at the polls.1 6 The
courts, while rejecting any abdication of their historical power of review, 17
have attempted to lay down rules that preserve their power and yet meet
the force of the fears just expressed. They admonish themselves that they
must cooperate reasonably with the other branches of the government, and
that their role is to review constitutional and statutory power and not
legislative or judicial wisdom.' 8 They accept the fact findings of the boards
if supported by substantial evidence. The important recent cases on the
subject, Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 10 and NLRB v. Pittsburgh
Steamship,20 construe the Administrative Procedure Act of 1946 as direct-
ing the courts to review board fact findings more completely than some of
them had done in recent years; at least to the extent of reviewing the whole
record and not merely looking for some evidence to support the findings.
The rule announced in Ohio Valley Water v. Ben Avon Borough, 2 ' and
Crowell v. Benson2 2 that courts will review more broadly, even to the
15. Note, 37 VA. L. REv. 617 (1951) suggests that the issue of whether women
may serve as bartenders is one transcending the labor law field and should be left to the
legislature. Of course, the legislature and the executive may at times wish the board to
act and take the political pressure from them. Time, July 30, 1951, p. 79, col. 1, reported
pressures exerted on the appropriate boards to handle the question of the regulatory
status of non pipeline-owning gas companies, after the presidential veto of the Kerr Bill.
16. Robson, Book Review, 26 N.Y.U.L.Q. REv. 534 (1951); GELLHORN, Op. Cit.
supra note 2. Various proposals have been made for the establishment of special Admin-
istrative Courts to review board actions. The American Bar Association Section on Ad-
ministrative Law opposes: see the Section Bulletin for 1951, Vol. 3, No. 3, p. 78. For
general discussions of the idea, see Schwartz, The Administrative Courts in France, 29
CAN. B. REv. 381 (1951); Howe, Book Review, 13 Mon. L. REv. 527 (1950). That an
aggrieved citizen can obtain relief at the polls would seem highly questionable, unless he
be of great political influence or one of a politically formidable number of aggrieved ones.
17. Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 179 F.2d 749 (2d Cir. 1950), 340 U.S.
474, 190 F.2d 429 (2d Cir. 1951).
18. United States v. Morgan, 307 U.S. 183 (1939); ICC v. Illinois Cent. R.R.,
215 U.S. 452 (1910).
19. Supra note 17.
20. 340 U.S. 498 (1951). See also Minneapolis-Honeywell Regulator Co. v. FTC,
191 F.2d 786 (7th Cir. 1951); NLRB v. Hart Cotton Mills Inc., 190 F.2d 964 (4th
Cir. 1951); Davis, Scope of judicial Review of Federal Administrative Action, 50 COL. L.
REv. 559 (1951); Jaffe, Substantive Evidence and the Whole Record, 64 HARv. L. REv.
1233 (1951).
21. 253 U.S. 287 (1920).
22. 285 U.S. 22 (1932).
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possible extent of trial de novo, board findings on constitutional or juris-
dictional facts, though long unused, 23 has not been overruled expressly and
may be brought into play in the federal courts as it has been in state courts."4
In the much discussed Dobson case25 the Supreme Court, after citing prior
decisions to the effect that the boards are more than fact-finding bodies, and
noting the fact that the distinction between issues of fact and of law is
difficult to draw, announced a rule of respect for board conclusions, except
on clear-cut issues of law (by which the Court apparently meant issues not
peculiar to the board's expertise); those that could be conveniently handled
by the judges or such as, either because of the subject-matter or the course
of past decisions, should be given the dignity and stabilizing status of law.29
Subsequent to the Dobson case, Congress indicated its dislike of the rule
there announced and attempted to lead the Court back to the common law
rule based on the traditional distinction between issues of law and fact,
reserving the former to the courts.27 A good guess is that the Court will
manage to retain much of the Dobson doctrine which, after all, relieves the
courts of heavy and troublesome traffic, and yet denies the boards the power
of radical departure from established legal concepts as in the days when the
New Deal was young and the current crop of judges untried.28
These decisions, together with those on administrative procedural due
process, indicate that the courts are not yet ready to abdicate their scrutiny
and curb of the Historical Ideal and leave the citizen to the mercies of the
ballot box.
RELATIONS WITH AFFECTED PARTIES OR GROUPS
Groups benefiting by the board's regulatory programs, of course, press
for active enforcement and expansion of the boards' powers, and accuse the
cautious board of dallying, reactionism and bias. On the other hand, the
subjected groups accuse the energetic board of bias, political radicalism, ex-
ceeding its powers and invasion of management's prerogatives.29 Both groups
23. Davis, supra note 20; Fuchs, Administrative Determinations and Personal Rights
in the Present Supreme Court, 24 IND. L.I. 163 (1949); Note, 25 CORNELL L.Q. 274
(1940).
24. Fuchs, supra note 23; 36 CEO. L.J. 337 (1948); 15 TEmp. L.Q. 185 (1941).
25. Dobson v. Commissioner, 320 U.S. 489 (1943).
26. NLRB v. Highland Park Mfg. Co., 341 U.S. 322 (1951); Burton-Sutton Oil Co.
v. Commissioner, 328 U.S. 25 (1946).
27. Congress revised the act involved in the Dobson case in 1948, 62 STAT. 870
(1948), 28 U.S.C. § 41. (Supp. 1951). just as the Dobson rule was used beyond the
tax subject, so is the revision likely to be expanded. The historical common law dis-
tinction between issues of fact and law was stated by the eminent Lord Mansfield in
Tindal v. Brown, 1 T.R. 168 (1786) that law issues were those likely to recur frequently
and those of such importance that the courts wished to give them the dignity of Law.
28. See the Highland Park case, supra note 26, and note the Court's conciliation
of the changing scenes in the Universal Camera case, supra note 17.
29. Though the boundary between permissible regulatory power and owner-manage-
ment power has greatly shifted at the expense of the latter, see Petitions of New Eng.
Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 80 A.2d 671 (Vt. 1951).
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marshal their legal, political and social friends and procedures.' 0 The courts
have refrained from laying down specific rules as to when they will prod
the hesitant board or restrain the zealous one. They frequently use the
analogy of the boards to public attorneys with considerable discretion as to
enforcement and to taking soundings of political, social and practical con-
ditions.8 '
RELATIONS WTH THE POLITICAL PARTIES
The Hoover Commission in 1949 found that the boards in their adjud-
icatory actions were relatively free from political pressures and, in any
event, had not yielded to such. 2 This is reassuring, and one can only hope
that the condition will continue in these days when politics are increasingly
all-pervading.
Of course, in their legislative actions the boards are more legitimate
game for political pressures. Doubtless a more frequently used device will
be for the administration to have the boards participate in allegedly im-
partial investigations of citizen interests and groups by "outside, impartial
experts or authorities." Some of these latter, whose sympathy with the ad-
ministration policy will have been carefully ascertained in advance, can
always be found. "'
THE LARGER ISSUE
Scrutiny and curbing of board action by these other groups, particularly
the courts, become more and more difficult as the number of boards and the
scope of each expands. Indeed, board power is a phase of the larger problem
of modem leviathan government. We shall probably never again have the
political liberty of the citizen of the days when government was small and
its actions limited and followable.' 4
The leviathan state is the product of prevailing tendencies to refer all
problems to the state, in the belief that politicians, however we may joke
about them as a defensive reflex, are the best resolvers of our troubles. The
30. See Dykstra, Impact of Pressure Groups on the Legislative Process, 26 WAsH.
U.L.Q. 306 (1951), relative to the lobbying activities of subjected parties and of the
boards themselves.
31. That federal courts apply the ultra vires brake to a dynamic board sparingly,
see, as an extreme example, Cemsco v. Walling, 324 U.S. 244 (1945). But ef. Baltimore
& Ohio R.R. v. United States, 71 F. Supp. 499 (1. Ohio 1947). In the famous case of
ICC v. Humbolt Steamship Co., 224 U.S. 474 (1912), the Supreme Court prodded the
reluctant Commission to extend its jurisdiction to Alaska. Doubtless, the Court was
impressed by the enormity of the restriction and absence of probable political reper-
cussions. Cf. NLRB v. Townsend, 185 F.2d 378 (9th Cir. 1950); Haleston Drug
Stores Inc. v. NLRB, 187 F.2d 418 (9th Cir. 1951), indicating broad discretion in a
cautious board to not use its power for a variety of considerations. Perhaps the most
unusual instance of directing board action was that of the ICC and Regional Rail Rates
Revision. The culminating case was New York v. United States, 331 U.S. 284 (1947).
32. HOOVER COMMssoN, T.&SK FORCE REPORT, Appendix N 20 (1949). Cf. N.Y.
Times, May 8, 1951, p. 45, col. 4, 5, reporting the Union Pacific Railroad asking dismissal
of a rate proceeding because of the pressure activities of certain western senators.
33. See N.Y. Times, Dec. 24, 1951, p. 20, col. 4, Financial Page Editorial, dis-
cussing the famous TNEC investigation of monopoly in the 1930s.
34. One need not be an Orwell (ORWELL, NINETEEN EIcHTY FOUR [1949]) or
a Hayek, (HAYEK, Tim ROAD TO SERFDOM [1944]) to be concerned.
AN IDEAL PRESERVED (?)
advocates of these tendencies argue that social achievement cannot be by
private action, or that if left to such, narrow, predatory groups will triumph s5
But certainly, in the light of history, a good brief could be made that most
of our achievements have been by private action. One may also ask whether
the politicians are not more predatory than private groups ever were, and
if political control, subject to error even if properly motivated, is not more
dangerous because of its vast coverage and difficulty of correction.36 Perhaps
as the errors, shenanigans, and costs of the state "boys" become more ap-
parent, private groups will insist upon and develop attitudes and techniques
of resolving their problems themselves. Then the citizen may rest easier, and
the mink coat producers recall 1951 as a boom period.
35. McDougal, Fuller v. the American Realists: an Intervention, 50 YALE L.J. 827
(1941); SANTAYANA, DOMINATIONS AND POWERS 426 (1951).
36. GoocH. COURTS AND CABINETS, Preface xx (1946), after reviewing the acti-
vities of some governments of the eighteenth century that would compare more than
favorably in ability and devotion to the general weal with modem successors, concludes
that it is a sad tale of waste of the hard-earned wealth of the people by their officials.
In Dairymen's League v. Brannan, 173 F.2d 57, 65 (2d Cir. 1949), Judge L. Hand re-
gisters an eloquent note of scepticism about the possibility of modem administrators
handling the tasks given them. In United States v. Wunderlich, 72 Sup. Ct. 154 (1951),
justice Douglas becomes almost Actonian in his expression of fear of the aggrandising and
corrupting effects of unfettered political power.
